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CITY OF WHITTiER

v.

nIXON

[24 C.M

Cai.App.2d 299 [66 P.2d 746]), but not to unknown claims
againSt others.
Plaintiff iI). the present action may therefore recover: (a)
damages for that part of the injury that can be attributed
to malpractice of the defendants, which, because of their representations, innocent or otherwise, were not included in
the judgment against Wubben; (b) that part of the damages included in the jUdgment against Wubben that can be
attributed to malpractice of defendants, less such part, if any,
of the $5,753.22 already received from Wubben as exceeds
~e ,amount of damages for which Wubben is alone responsible.
Edmonds, J., concurred.

Aug. 1944]

[4]

[5]

'Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied Septemper 1,1944.
[6]

fL. A. No. 19005. In Bank. Aug. 11, 1944;]

'OITY OF WHITTIER et al., Petitioners, v. GUY N. DIXON,
as City Clerk, etc., Respondent.
.

Ell

'Mandamus-Duties Enforceable.-Mandamus wUl lie to COUlpel theperfonnance of a ministerial duty, such as the signing
, of a bond or, wanant or the issuance of a warrant.
[2]Statutes-Titl~Su1li.ciency of.....;.The title of an act meets
the requi,rements of Const., art. IV, § 24, if it contains a rea, ;, sonably intelligible reference to the subject to which the, legislation is addressed.
'[3J Automobiles-Vehicle Parking District Act of 1943.-The
title of the Vehicle Parking District Act of 1943 (Stats. 1943,
p. 2859; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1943, Act 5131.3) contains
, a reasonably intelligible reference to the subject to which the
legislation is addressed. The levy and collection of assess'ments mentioned in the title include reassessments, and the
reference in the title to the acquisition and construction of
parking places and other improvements for parking includes
,[1] See 16 Cal.Jur. 804; 34 Am.Jur. 859.
[2J 'See 23 Cal.Jur. 650 j 50 Am.Jur. 137.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Mandamus, § 6; [2] Statuttls, § 48;
A,)ltomnbiles" § 8.
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the acquisition and improvement of lands, property and
rights of way necessary or convenient for ingress to or
egress from any parking place.
Id.-Vehicle Parking District Act of 1943.-The Vehicle
Parking District Act of 1943 does not violate Const., art.
XI, § 13, prohibiting the delegation of any municipal function to a special commission, where the parking place commissioners therein authorized to be appointed are city officers
appointed by the legislative body of the city when it elects
to acquire parking places under the act, and are removable
at the pleasure of that body.
Id.~Parking Places.-Legislation authorizing the acquisition
of parking places to serve the public is valid so long as it
serves some public purpose. Public parking places relieve
congestion and reduce traffic hazards and therefore serve a
public purpose.
Id.-Parking Places-Aflsessments.-Parking places that tend
to, stabilize a business section benefit the property in the
vicinity so as to justify the levy of a special assessment in
connection with the acquisition of such places;
ld.-Parking Places-Eminent Domain.-A city can condemn
property for parking places under the Vehicle Parking District Act of 1943, although snch authority is not granted by
the eminent domain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, as the Vehicle Parking District Act is a general law
and expressly authorizes the exercise of the power of eminent
domain to acquire parking lots.

PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel a city clerk to
countersign a warrant for payment of costs of pUblication of
an ordinance of intention. Writ granted.
Henry L. Knoop, City Attorney, 0 'Melveny & Myers and
James.L. Beebe for Petitioners.
Clyde C. Woodworth for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-By this proceeding in mandamus petitioners seek to compel respondent city clerk to countersign a warrant for the payment of the costs of publication of an ordinance of intention, in a proceeding for the formation of Vehicle Parking District No. 1 of the City of Whlttier, under
the Vehicle Parking District Act of 1943. (Stats. 1943, ch.
971, p. 2859; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1943, Act 5131.3.) Respondent has refused to countersign the warrant contending
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that the statute pursuant to which the publication was made,
is invalid. The regularity of the proceedings is admitted.
[1] It is established that mandamus will lie to compel the
performance of a ministerial duty such as the signing of a
bond or warrant or the, issuance of a warrant. (Golden Gate
Bridge etc. Dist. v. Felt, 214 Cal. 308, 316 [5 P.2d 585] ; Mercury Herald 00. v. Moore, 22 Ca1.2d 269 [138 P.2d 673, 147
A.L.R. 1111].) The only issue in this case, therefore, is the
validity of the Vehicle Parking District Act of 1943.
Respondent contends that the title of the act does not meet
the requirements of section 24 of article IV of the California
Constitution, on the ground that the provisions of the act
relating to reassessments, the acquisition of property for opening, widening, straightening, or extending of streets or alleys
necessary or convenient for ingress to or egress from any
parking place, and the improvement of such streets and alleys,
are not within the title of the act. The title of the act reads
as follows: "An act to provide for the formation of districts
within municipalities for the acquisition, construction, maintenance and operation of parking places, garages and other
improvements for the parking of motor vehicles; the levy and
collection of assessments upon property in said districts; the
issuance, sale and payment of bonds secured by such assessments; the collection of rentals, fees, and charges for the use
- of such parking places, garages or other improvements; the
administration thereof; the levy of taxes; and the powen; and
duties of cities relating thereto." [2] The title of an act
meets the constitutional requirements if it contains a reasonably intelligible reference to the subject to which the legislation is addressed. (Heron v. Riley, 209 Cal. 507 [28~ P. 160] ;
Evans v. Superior Oourt, 215 Cal. 58 [8 P.2d 467]; Southern
Service 00. v. Oounty of Los Angeles, 15 Cal.2d 1 [97 P.2d
963] ; Powers Farms v. Oonsolidated Irr. Dist., 19 Ca1.2d 123
[119 P.2d 717].) [3] The title in question fulfills this condition. The levy and collection of assessments mentioned in
the title includes reassessments, for a reassessment is merely
an assessment levied in lieu of some earlier assessment. The
reference in the title to the acquisition and construction of
parking places and other improvements for the parking of
motor vehicles includes the acquisition and improvement of
lands, property, and rights of way necessary or convenient
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for ingress to or egress from any parking place as a necessary
incident to the construction of the parking place itself.
(Powers Farms v. Oonsolidated Irr. Dist., 19 Ca1.2d 123 [119
P.2d 717].)
[4] Respondent contends that by authorizing the appointment of a board of parking place commissioners, the act violates section 13 of article XI of the California Constitution
prohibiting the delegation of any municipal function to a
special cummission. The parking place commissioners, however, are city officers appointed by the legislative body of the
city when it elects to acquire parking places under the act,
and are removable at the pleasure of that body. It is the local
governing body and not the Legislature that confers upon
the ,"ommission the right to exercise its function. Such a
commission does not come within the prohibition of section 13
of article XI of the Constitution. (Lent v. Tillson, 72 Cal. 404
[14 P. 71] ; In re Pfahler, 150 Cal. 71, 87 [88 P. 270, 11 Ann.
Cas. 911, 11 L.R.A.N.S. 1092J ; Housing Authority v. Dockweiler, 14 Cal.2d 437, 463 [94 P.2d 794].)
[5] Respondent contends that public parking places are
not public improvements. The Legislature, however, has expressly authorized the acquisition of parking places to serve
the public, and the legislation is valid so long as it serves some
public purpose. (In re Smith, 143 Cal. 368 [77 P. 180];
Oounty of Los Angeles v. Dodge, 51 Cal.App. 492 [197 P.
403] ; Egan v. San Francisco, 165 Cal. 576 [133 P. 294, Ann.
Cas. 1915A 754] ; Larsen v. San Francisco, 182 Cal. 1 [186
P. 757] ; Irish v. Hahn, 208 Cal. 339 [281 P. 385, 66 A.L.R.
1382].) Just as public streets can be used :Eor the parking of
motor vehicles, property can be acquired :Eor the same use.
Moreover, public parking places relieve congestion and reduce
traffic hazards and therefore serve a public purpose. They
may be compared to municipal airports, which have been
recognized as public improvements. (Krenwinkle v. Oity of
Los Angeles, 4 Ca1.2d 611 [51 P.2d 1098] ; see 63 A.L.R. 777;
69 A.L.R. 325; 135 A.L.R. 755.)
[6] The levy of a special assessment is justified if the
improvement is a public one and the property to be assessed
will receive a special benefit. (Mills v. Oity of Elsinore, 93
Cal.App. 753 [270 P. 224] ; Federal Oonstruction 00. v. Ensign, 59 Cal.App. 200 [210 P. 536] ; Lloyd v. Redondo Beach,

.~
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124 Cal.App. 541 [12 P.2d 1087].) Merchants frequently
acquire and operate private parking places to attract customers and vacate buildings when no parking space for customers is available. Parking places that tend to stabilize a
business section, by making it readily accessible to trade, benefit the property in the vicinity. (See Lloyd v. Oity of Redondo Beach, supra.)
[7] Respondent contends finally that the city cannot condemn property for parking places, on the ground that such
authority is not granted by the eminent domain provisions of
the Code of Civil Procedure. The Vehicle Parking District
Act, however, is a general law and expressly provides for the
exercise of the power of eminent domain to acquire parking
lots. (See Frank v. Maguire, 201 Cal. 414, 422 [257 P. 515].)
Let the peremptory writ issue as prayed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Carter, J., and Schauer,
J., concurred.
EDMONDS, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in
the conclusion of my associates that the Vehicle Parking District Act of 1943 (Stats. 1943, p. 2859) is valid upon its face,
but I again point out that n question of public interest is decided in a "friendly suit" to which only the city, its clerk, awl
fhe publisher of the municipality's leg::.! advertising nrc parties. In my opinion, such an action is collusive and for the
reasons I have previously stated, should not be entertained
by this court. (Oity and Oounty of San Francisco v. Boyd,
22 Ca1.2d 685, 707 [140 P.2d 666] ; and Oity and Oounty of
San Francisco v. Linares, 16 Ca1.2d 441, 448 [106 P.2d 639].)
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SCRIPPS MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC. (a Nonprofit Corporation), Respondent, v. CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION, Appellant.
(Three Cases.)
[1] Unemployment Relief-Remedies of Employer-Action to Recover Protested Payment.-·The only express provision in the
Unemployment Insurance Act for court review is § 45.10,
added to the statute in 1939 (Stats. 1939, p. 2051; Deering'S
Gen. Laws. 1939 Supp., Act 878Od), which permits an employer to sue to recover contributions paid under protest.
[2] ld.-Remedies of Employer-Action to Recover Protested Payment-Conditions Precedent.-An employer who claims an
exemption from assessment under the Unemployment Insurance
.Act is not required to ask a reassessment as provided in § 45.5,
hefore he may sue to recover contributions paid by him under
protest, as the right to bring such an action is directly given
in § 45.10 without qualification. The rule that an administrative remedy provided by statute must be exhausted before the
I\ourts will act does not apply in such a situation.
[3] rd.-Employers Exempt from Contributions-Charitable Institutions.-The wide and varied nature of the exemptions
provided in the Unemployment Insurance Act, § 7(g), indicates an intention to give to the words "operated exclusively
for ... charitable ... purposes" a broad rather than a strict
meaning, and to apply the sort of standards to charitable
institutions which are applied to the others named in said
section.
[4) Statutes-Construction-Statutes Adopted from Other Jurisdictions.-Where the language used in Unemployment Insurance Act, § 7 (g), is practically identical with that used in
similar sections of the federal legislation and in that of many
states, the interpretation placed on that language by federal
and other courts is persuasive.
[5) Unemployment Relief - Remedies of Employer - Action to
Recover Protested Payment--Evidence.-In consolidated actions by a nonprofit hospital corporation to recover contribu[1] See 11 Cal.Jur. Ten-year Supp. (Pocket Part), "Unemployment Reserves and Social Security."
[4] See 23 Cal.Jur. 794; 50 Am.Jur. 47l.
McK. Dig. References: [1-3, 5, 6] Unemployment Relief; [4J
Statutes, § 199.

